Tom Horne’s gift to the Mexican American Studies Plaintiffs
by Andrew Walanski on Mar. 17, 2012, under Education, Leadership, UncategorizedI am not a legal expert and I’m not sure if these issues have already been raised by the MAS Plaintiffs, but I’ll give it a go anyways. In Thomas Horne’s reply in support of John Huppenthal’s cross-motion for summary judgment he contends that A.R.S. 15-112 is not selectively applied to the Mexican American Studies program, “Plaintiffs’ argument that the law is vague as-applied because it allegedly is being enforced in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner has no support in fact or law” http://www.scribd.com/doc/85643398/Tom-Horne-vs-MAS-students. This is a fallacious claim and is refuted by Mr. Horne’s own words on numerous occasions (both as Superintendent of Public instruction and Attorney General). For example, the statements he made during the debate that took place at the University of Arizona last year between him and attorney Richard Martinez:
The Ethnic Studies Program in the Tucson Unified School District does just the opposite. It divides students by race. Now I’m fully aware that none of the courses are exclusionary and that you can go into a course if you don’t belong to that race, but the numbers of people not of that race are very small. The courses are predominantly, primarily divided by race. So we have Raza Studies for the Latino kids, we have African American Studies for the African American kids, we have Asian studies for the Asian kids, we have Indian studies for the Native American kids. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=It0mw_bAhXg
Aside from the fact that he acknowledges “none of the courses are exclusionary,” what we have here is Mr. Horne’s own acknowledgement that the Ethnic Studies program in its entirety violates A.R.S. 15-112. This leads to the question: Why selectively enforce the statute against one program of study even though you are aware of and acknowledge other programs of study within the same school district have the same “violation?” Mr. Horne’s only potential answer is limited to the idea that the Mexican American Studies program in TUSD was the only program that had complaints levied against it. Nowhere in the statute does it state that an investigation or determination of a statutory violation can only take place after a complaint has been filed against the district. The language from the statute in this regard is quite clear:
B. If the state board of education or the superintendent of public instruction determines that a school district or charter school is in violation of subsection A, the state board of education or the superintendent of public instruction shall notify the school district or charter school that it is in violation of subsection A. http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/15/00112.htm&Title=15&DocType=ARS
The statute clearly states “If the state board of education or the superintendent of public instruction determines…” and it does not establish any requirement as to how the Superintendent arrives to that determination. Mr. Horne, through his own admission in multiple public appearances, clearly establishes that when he was Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction he determined there were multiple violations of A.R.S. 15-112 in TUSD, yet he only decided to enforce the law against the Mexican American Studies program. He chose to ignore the violations by the African American Studies and Asian American Studies programs. Again, I’m not a legal expert but I feel like this is an inconsistency that cannot be ignored.
Another contention of Mr. Horne’s is, “the Plaintiffs provide no facts to rebut the presumption that the Superintendent is not honestly enforcing the law with integrity” http://www.scribd.com/doc/85643398/Tom-Horne-vs-MAS-students. Superintendent Huppenthal’s intent is irrelevant and the only test that matters is whether the application of the enforcement of A.R.S. 15-112 is discriminatory. This is clear in Hernandez v. Texas 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954) which establishes:
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no members of this class among the over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner. The judgment of conviction must be reversed.
The question is not intent it is whether the “result bespeaks discrimination” and that is exactly what we have in this case.
There are many inconsistencies both legal and logical in Mr. Horne’s reply which I will try to get to in follow-up posts. For example, he argues that the statute “does not prohibit the discussion of anything“ http://www.scribd.com/doc/85643398/Tom-Horne-vs-MAS-students, yet he frequently refers to curricular materials and textbooks as evidence of violations. If the statute does not prohibit the discussion of anything then why are these materials being singled out as violations? Why is it okay, according to Mr. Huppenthal, to use Mein Kampf as an instructional tool, which obviously “promulgate[s] racial stereotypes?” Why was the only possible way to come into compliance to completely eliminate the program?
Finally I’m most confused about Mr. Horne’s language when he discusses, “the fundamental American principle of treating people as individuals, on their individual merit, rather than on the basis of the race they were born into” http://www.scribd.com/doc/85643398/Tom-Horne-vs-MAS-students. A major part of the history of this country is that it was built on slave labor, and the last time I checked, whether you were a slave or not was determined by your race. How is that a “fundamental American principle?”
What exactly was Mr. Horne doing in 1963 when he joined the Civil Rights Movement in the March on Washington? What exactly was he fighting and marching for? The Civil Rights Movement was based on the discrimination of distinct classes of people based solely on their race. Was that fundamental American principle in action there? How ironic is it that Mr. Horne has an issue with the idea that, “a white power structure conspired to suppress them and relegate them to a second-class existence while in Letter from Birmingham Jail Dr. King states, “It is unfortunate that demonstrations are taking place in Birmingham, but it is even more unfortunate that the city’s white power structure left the Negro community with no alternative.”
What argument or legal alchemy does he have to address this?